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Abstract
We study robust welfare comparisons of learning biases, i.e., deviations from
correct Bayesian updating. Given a true signal distribution, we deem one bias
more harmful than another if it yields lower objective expected payoffs in all decision problems. We characterize this ranking in static (one signal) and dynamic
(many signals) settings. While the static characterization compares posteriors signal-by-signal, the dynamic characterization employs an “efficiency index”
quantifying the speed of belief convergence. Our results yield welfare-founded
quantifications of the severity of well-documented biases. Moreover, the static
and dynamic rankings can conflict, and “smaller” biases can be worse in dynamic
settings.
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1.1

Introduction
Motivation and Overview

A growing literature in behavioral economics studies ways in which individuals’ learning departs from correct Bayesian updating, whether due to psychological biases and
limitations or due to simplifying assumptions about a complex environment. Experimental work has documented a variety of systematic learning biases, such as
overconfidence, under- or overreaction to information, motivated reasoning, or confirmation bias (for a recent survey, see Benjamin, 2019). Such learning biases may
come to bear on many important economic problems, from career choices to financial
investment decisions and voting, by leading to inefficient behavior.
In this paper, we ask how to compare the welfare costs of different learning biases,
and how to do so robustly, i.e., independently of the particular economic problem a
biased agent might face. Given a true signal distribution, we deem one bias more
harmful than another if it induces a lower objective expected payoff in all decision
problems. Our main results characterize this welfare ranking in both a static (one
signal observation) and a dynamic (many signal observations) setting. While the
static characterization is based on comparing interim beliefs after each signal observation, for the dynamic characterization, we introduce a “learning efficiency index”
that quantifies the speed at which beliefs converge. Thus, complementing a large theoretical literature that derives asymptotic beliefs under various learning biases (see
Section 1.2), a key ingredient of our analysis is to understand how learning biases
affect short- and medium-run beliefs.
Our results provide a welfare-founded approach to quantifying the severity of specific learning biases that are documented and estimated in experiments. For some
commonly studied biases, the welfare-founded quantifications we obtain conflict with
intuitive measures of severity used in applied work. We also highlight several general
implications: In particular, the static and dynamic welfare rankings can be inconsistent; that is, some biases are robustly less harmful than others in the short run,
but robustly more harmful in the medium run. Moreover, “smaller” biases can be
more harmful according to the dynamic ranking; indeed, when agents are uncertain
about both payoff-relevant states and the signal structure, correctly specified Bayesian
updating can be robustly worse than some learning biases.
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Illustrative example: Asymmetric updating. To illustrate our exercise and
some of its implications, consider the following commonly studied learning bias (e.g.,
Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus, and Rosenblat, 2014). An agent learns about some fixed
and unknown state θ (e.g., her ability) that is either low, θ, or high, θ. Prior probabilities are p0 (θ). She observes a sequence (x1 , · · · , xT ) of T signals, drawn conditionally
i.i.d. from the binary set {x, x} with probabilities 0 < µ(x | θ) < µ(x|θ) < 1. Thus,
signal x (resp. x) is “good news” (resp. “bad news”) about θ. After each signal observation xt , the agent updates her belief pt using a distorted likelihood ratio,
pt−1 (θ)
pt (θ)
=
pt (θ)
pt−1 (θ)



µ(xt |θ)
µ(xt |θ)

c(xt )
,

(1)

where c(x) > 0 for each x. The case c(x) = c(x) = 1 corresponds to standard
Bayesian updating. By contrast, (1) can accommodate under- or overinference from
some signals and allows for these departures to vary across different signals. For
example, c(x) > c(x) captures a form of “ego-biased” updating, where the agent
reacts more strongly to good news about her ability than to bad news.
The experimental literature documents bias (1) and has estimated distortion parameters for different subjects.1 However, based on casual inspection, it might not be
obvious how to evaluate the severity of this bias under different distortion functions
c(·). This paper provides a welfare-founded approach: Suppose that, upon observing
(x1 , · · · , xT ), the agent faces a decision problem, in which the payoff to each action
depends on θ and she maximizes her subjective expected payoff given her posterior
pT . Using our results, we can characterize when the agent’s welfare under distortion
c1 (·) exceeds that under c2 (·) robustly, i.e., regardless of which decision problem she
might face. Here, welfare is defined as the agent’s ex-ante expected payoff evaluated
according to the true probability measure over signals.
Static ranking: As a benchmark, suppose the agent observes a single signal draw
(T = 1). Then our results imply that c1 (·) is less harmful than c2 (·) in every decision
problem if and only if c1 (·) distorts each signal less than c2 (·), i.e., for each x,
c2 (x) ≤ c1 (x) ≤ 1

or

1

1 ≤ c1 (x) ≤ c2 (x).

(2)

The estimated parameters in Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus, and Rosenblat (2014) are c(x) = 0.27,
c(x) = 0.17. Subsequent work has estimated how distortion parameters vary with gender and other
demographic characteristics (see the survey by Benjamin, 2019).
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Dynamic ranking: Suppose instead that the agent has access to many signal draws.
We show that in every decision problem and for all large enough T , the ranking
depends only on the ratio ci (x)/ci (x), where welfare is higher the “closer” this ratio
is to 1. While it is easy to see that this ratio determines the agent’s asymptotic
beliefs, our key observation is that this ratio also determines the speed at which
beliefs converge. This is crucial in allowing us to compare welfare across the large
class of distortions c1 (·) and c2 (·) that induce the same asymptotic beliefs.
Note that the static and dynamic rankings can be inconsistent: For instance, consider any asymmetric distortion c1 (x) 6= c1 (x), no matter how close to 1, and any
symmetric distortion c2 (x) = c2 (x), no matter how different from 1. Then, c1 (·) is
worse than c2 (·) according to the dynamic ranking, even if c1 (·) distorts each individual signal less than c2 (·) and hence is less harmful based on the static ranking.
Moreover, measures that are sometimes used to quantify the severity of bias (1) in applications, such as the difference ci (x) − ci (x) (e.g., Coutts, 2019), can be inconsistent
with both our welfare-founded rankings.
Overview. Our general model (Section 2) features an arbitrary finite state space
and conditionally i.i.d. true signal structure, and we consider any learning bias that
can be represented as Bayesian updating under some possibly incorrect perception of
signal likelihoods. This encompasses misspecified Bayesian learning, as well as several
important cases of non-Bayesian learning, such as the illustrative example above.
Section 3 characterizes our welfare rankings in the binary-state setting (Section 4.1
extends to general finite state spaces). Generalizing the illustrative example, bias 1
is less harmful than bias 2 according to the static ranking if each signal is interpreted
more accurately under bias 1, as formalized by a nested likelihood ratio condition
(Proposition 1).
Our main focus is on the dynamic welfare ranking. For this purpose, we define
a learning efficiency index, which for any true and perceived signal structure captures how likely the agent is to encounter signal sequences that make her unable to
distinguish between the two states. The key observation, based on arguments from
large deviation theory, is that this efficiency index quantifies the speed at which the
agent’s beliefs converge. Using this observation, Theorems 1 and 2 show that for
any biases that give rise to the same asymptotic beliefs, the dynamic welfare ranking
is generically complete and is characterized by the learning efficiency index: With
correct (resp., incorrect) asymptotic beliefs, higher (resp., lower) learning efficiency is
4

better, as this reduces the medium-run likelihood of suboptimal choices in all decision
problems. For biases that do not share the same asymptotic beliefs, the difference in
asymptotic beliefs can be used to conduct a dynamic welfare comparison.
Based on these characterizations, we discuss when the static and dynamic rankings
are inconsistent. In addition to the illustrative example, we also apply our welfare
rankings to learning under partisan bias and under overconfidence, shedding light on
the short- and medium-run inefficiencies these biases induce.
In our baseline model, correctly specified Bayesian learning (trivially) weakly dominates all learning biases according to both the static and dynamic welfare rankings.
However, in the dynamic setting, we identify a unique class of biases, namely the
special case of (1) with a constant distortion power c (Phillips and Edwards, 1966),
that attains the same learning efficiency as the correctly specified case. This result
implies that “larger” biases can robustly outperform “smaller” biases in dynamic settings. Moreover, Section 4.2 considers an extension where the agent not only learns
about a payoff-relevant state, but is also uncertain about the signal structure. Under such uncertainty, we show that some learning biases strictly outperform correctly
specified Bayesian learning according to the dynamic ranking, by speeding up the
rate at which the agent learns the true payoff-relevant state.

1.2

Related Literature

This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on misspecified Bayesian and nonBayesian learning. Much work studies how various learning biases affect asymptotic
beliefs, in both single-agent (e.g., Berk, 1966; Nyarko, 1991; Fudenberg, Romanyuk,
and Strack, 2017; Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack, 2018, 2020; He, 2018; Bushong and
Gagnon-Bartsch, 2019) and social learning settings (e.g., Eyster and Rabin, 2010;
Bohren, 2016; Gagnon-Bartsch, 2017; Frick, Iijima, and Ishii, 2020a). Several recent
papers provide more general criteria to determine convergence to asymptotic beliefs
(Bohren and Hauser, 2018; Esponda, Pouzo, and Yamamoto, 2019; Frick, Iijima, and
Ishii, 2020b; Fudenberg, Lanzani, and Strack, 2020).2 In contrast, our focus is on the
welfare implications of learning biases, and a key ingredient of our analysis concerns
short-/medium-run beliefs and the speed at which beliefs converge. In this paper,
we restrict attention to the case of single-agent learning with exogenous i.i.d. signals,
2

Esponda and Pouzo (2016, 2020) formalize the notion of Berk-Nash equilibrium, which captures
steady states of general misspecified learning dynamics. See also Spiegler (2016).
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but Section 5 briefly discusses some extensions.
Our exercise is broadly related to a number of papers that examine whether
and how specific misspecifications can “survive” based on a variety of selection criteria, including performance in financial markets (e.g., Sandroni, 2000; Massari, 2020),
goodness-of-fit tests (e.g., Cho and Kasa, 2015; Gagnon-Bartsch, Rabin, and Schwartzstein,
2018; Schwartzstein and Sunderam, 2021), voting (e.g., Levy, Razin, and Young,
2019), and subjective welfare (e.g., Montiel Olea, Ortoleva, Pai, and Prat, 2019; Eliaz
and Spiegler, 2020). The most closely related papers within this literature are Fudenberg and Lanzani (2020) and He and Libgober (2020), who study selection based
on objective welfare. These papers take an evolutionary approach, by characterizing
which forms of misspecification are stable against mutations. While they conduct their
analysis in a fixed environment and based on long-run outcomes, we compare welfare
across all decision problems and rely on short-/medium-run beliefs. He and Libgober
(2020) show that misspecified agents can be better off than correctly specified agents
under strategic externalities. Section 4.2 highlights an alternative mechanism in a
single-agent setting, where some forms of misspecified learning outperform correctly
specified learning by speeding up belief convergence.3
Finally, our focus on comparing welfare in all decision problems is similar in spirit
to the literature on robust comparisons of statistical experiments (e.g., Blackwell,
1951; Moscarini and Smith, 2002; Azrieli, 2014; Mu, Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz,
2021). This literature conducts robust welfare comparisons across different true signal
structures assuming that agents are correctly specified, whereas we fix a true signal
structure and compare welfare across different misperceptions of the signal structure.
Our static ranking is the counterpart in our setting of Blackwell’s (1951) order, while
our dynamic ranking is the analog of Moscarini and Smith (2002); indeed, as we
discuss in Remark 2, our learning efficiency index can be seen to generalize the efficiency index in Moscarini and Smith (2002). One interesting difference is that if one
information structure dominates another in the sense of Blackwell (1951), this implies
dominance in the sense of Moscarini and Smith (2002), because the Blackwell order
is preserved under T -fold repetition of signal draws. In contrast, we show that our
static ranking over misperceptions can be reversed in the dynamic setting.
3

Steiner and Stewart (2016); Gossner and Steiner (2018) consider static single-agent settings
and show that misspecification can be beneficial when agents cannot perfectly implement their
subjectively optimal strategies due to the presence of noise.
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2

Setting

A state θ is drawn once and for all from a finite set Θ according to a full-support
distribution p0 ∈ ∆(Θ). An agent does not observe the realized state θ, but learns
about θ from signal observations. Specifically, there is a finite set of signals X, and
the agent observes a sequence of T draws of signals, xT = (x1 , x2 , · · · , xT ) ∈ X T .
Each signal xt is drawn conditionally i.i.d. according to a true signal structure
µ := (µθ )θ∈Θ , where µθ ∈ ∆(X) denotes the true signal distribution conditional on
state θ. Assume that each µθ has full support over X and that µθ 6= µθ0 for all θ 6= θ0 .
The agent has the correct prior p0 over states, but her learning from signals is
potentially biased.4 Specifically, the agent’s perceived signal structure is µ̂ :=
(µ̂θ )θ∈Θ , where µ̂θ ∈ RX
++ captures the agent’s perceived likelihood of each signal
conditional on state θ, and µ̂θ 6= µ̂θ0 for all θ 6= θ0 . While we assume that µ̂θ (x) > 0
P
for each x ∈ X, we do not require that x∈X µ̂θ (x) = 1. As we discuss in Remark 1,
this makes it possible to accommodate both misspecified Bayesian learning as well
as certain well-studied classes of non-Bayesian learning. We call the agent correctly
specified if µ̂ = µ.
Upon observing the signal sequence xT = (x1 , x2 , · · · , xT ), the agent forms a
posterior belief pT (· | xT ) ∈ ∆(Θ) by applying Bayes’ rule according to her perceived
signal structure. That is, for all θ0 ∈ Θ,
0

T

pT (θ | x ) = P

p0 (θ0 )

QT

µ̂θ0 (xτ )
.
Q
T
00
τ =1 µ̂θ00 (xτ )
θ00 ∈Θ p0 (θ )
τ =1

(3)

After forming the posterior belief, the agent faces a decision problem, which
is a nonempty finite set A of acts.5 An act is a vector a ∈ RΘ , where aθ denotes
the agent’s payoff from a conditional on state θ. Given any decision problem A and
realized signal sequence xT , the agent chooses an act a∗ (xT ) ∈ A to maximize her
4
It is straightforward to allow agents to update beliefs based on incorrect and/or heterogeneous
priors, while still defining ex-ante expected payoffs in (5) based on the true prior p0 . The dynamic
welfare characterizations (Theorems 1–2) remain true unchanged. For the static characterization
(Proposition 1), we generalize condition (6) to the requirement that after each signal x, the interim
belief under µ̂1 is a convex combination of the beliefs under µ and under µ̂2 .
5
The finiteness restriction can be relaxed when T = 1, but is important for the dynamic case.
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subjective expected payoff under her posterior belief pT (· | xT ):
a∗ (xT ) ∈ argmax pT (· | xT ) · a.

(4)

a∈A

For ease of exposition, we assume throughout the main text that µ̂ and A are such
that (4) admits a unique solution. All results extend to the case with ties and our
proofs in the appendix allow for this possibility.6
The agent’s welfare is her ex-ante expected payoff to choosing her subjectively
optimal act at each xT . Here, taking the perspective of an outside observer, expectations over signal realizations are based on the true signal structure µ. That is, letting
Pθ denote the true probability measure over signal sequences in X T conditional on
state θ and letting Eθ denote the corresponding expectation operator, the agent’s
welfare is given by
X
WT (µ, µ̂, A) =
p0 (θ)Eθ [a∗θ (xT )].
(5)
θ∈Θ

Remark 1 (Examples). When µ̂θ ∈ ∆(X) for each θ, our setting corresponds to
misspecified Bayesian learning, capturing, for example, overconfidence (Example 2)
or correlation neglect (e.g., Spiegler, 2016; Enke and Zimmermann, 2017). By alP
lowing that x∈X µ̂θ (x) 6= 1, the model additionally nests several important classes
of non-Bayesian learning, including the illustrative example on asymmetric updating
(Section 1.1) and partisan bias (Example 1). At the same time, the assumption that
the posterior pT is formed according to Bayes’ rule under µ̂ rules out some other
classes of non-Bayesian updating, such as Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni (2010). Finally, while we focus on the simplest possible setting of learning from exogenous i.i.d.
signals, Section 5 briefly discusses extensions to active learning or belief-dependent
updating (e.g., confirmation bias), as well as to intertemporally correlated signals. N

3

Welfare Rankings: Binary States

Given any true signal structure µ, consider two agents i = 1, 2 that differ only in their
perceived signal structures µ̂i . We seek to characterize when agent 1’s bias is robustly
6

Specifically, the static welfare characterization (Proposition 1) remains valid as long as both
agents employ the same tie-breaking rule (i.e., strict total order over acts) to select among multiple
solutions to (4). The dynamic characterizations (Theorems 1–4) remain valid even when both agents
employ possibly different tie-breaking rules.
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less harmful than agent 2’s, in the sense that agent 1’s welfare exceeds agent 2’s
welfare at all decision problems. As a benchmark, we first consider a static welfare
ranking : This assumes that agents observe only a single signal draw (T = 1) and
requires that for all A, W1 (µ, µ̂1 , A) exceeds W1 (µ, µ̂2 , A). Our main focus is on a
dynamic welfare ranking : This assumes that agents have access to many signal
draws and requires that for all A, WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) exceeds WT (µ, µ̂2 , A) whenever T is
large enough.
For ease of exposition, we focus throughout this section on a binary state environment, Θ = {θ, θ}. Section 4.1 extends the results to general finite state spaces.

3.1

Static Ranking

The following result provides a sufficient condition under which agent 1’s bias is
less harmful than agent 2’s according to the static welfare ranking: Condition (6)
requires that agent 1’s interpretation of each signal x is more accurate than agent
2’s interpretation, in the sense that the perceived signal likelihood ratio under µ̂1 is
in between the true likelihood ratio and that under µ̂2 . This guarantees that agent
1’s posterior following each signal realization is a convex combination of the true
posterior and agent 2’s posterior. Hence, agent 1’s objective function is more aligned
with the true objective function than agent 2’s.7
Proposition 1. Suppose that, for all x ∈ X,
µ̂1θ (x)
µ̂2θ (x)
µθ (x)
≥ 1
≥ 2
µθ (x)
µ̂θ (x)
µ̂θ (x)

or

µ̂1θ (x)
µ̂2θ (x)
µθ (x)
≤ 1
≤ 2 .
µθ (x)
µ̂θ (x)
µ̂θ (x)

(6)

Then W1 (µ, µ̂1 , A) ≥ W1 (µ, µ̂2 , A) for all decision problems A. The converse holds if
µ, µ̂1 , µ̂2 satisfy the comonotonic likelikelihood ratio property.
For the necessity direction, we say that µ, µ̂1 , µ̂2 satisfy the comonotic likelihood
ratio property if there is a linear order > on signals such that for any x, x0 ∈ X
with x > x0 , there exists γxx0 ∈ R+ such that for all ν ∈ {µ, µ̂1 , µ̂2 },
νθ (x)
ν (x0 )
> γxx0 > θ 0 .
νθ (x)
νθ (x )

(7)

7
The logic is similar to results on time inconsistency, where welfare is monotonic in the degree of
preference alignment between ex-ante and ex-post preferences (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001).
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We note that under condition (6), the inequality W1 (µ, µ̂1 , A) ≥ W1 (µ, µ̂2 , A) is
strict in any decision problem in which the agents’ chosen acts differ at some x.
Asymmetric updating: In the illustrative example from Section 1.1, we have
ci (x)

µ̂i (x)
µ (x)
X = {x, x}, µθ (x) > µθ (x), and µ̂θi (x) = µθθ (x)
, where ci (x) > 0 for each agent
θ
i and signal x. Thus, the sufficient condition (6) for the static welfare ranking is
equivalent to the requirement (2) that for each signal x, either c2 (x) ≤ c1 (x) ≤ 1 or
1 ≤ c1 (x) ≤ c2 (x). Moreover, setting x > x and γxx = 1, true and perceived likelihood
ratios satisfy the comonotonic likelihood ratio property (7). Thus, by Proposition 1,
condition (2) is both necessary and sufficient for the static welfare ranking.

3.2

Dynamic Ranking: Correct Asymptotic Beliefs

We now characterize the dynamic welfare ranking, where for any decision problem A,
agent 1’s welfare WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) exceeds agent 2’s welfare WT (µ, µ̂2 , A) whenever T is
large enough. This ranking is relevant when agents have access to many signal draws,
as is natural in most learning settings.
In this section, we present our approach under the assumption that both agents’
biases are small enough that they learn the true state as T → ∞; Section 3.4 shows
how to extend this approach to the case where agents’ beliefs are asymptotically
incorrect. When asymptotic beliefs are correct under both biases, they cannot be
used to compare welfare. Instead, we show that the dynamic welfare ranking is
characterized by a learning efficiency index that captures the speed of convergence.
Formally, for any ν, µ ∈ RX
+ , define the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of
ν relative to µ by
X
µ(x)
,
KL(µ, ν) =
µ(x) log
ν(x)
x
with the convention that 0 log 0 = 00 = 0 and log 10 = ∞. This extends the usual definition of KL divergence between probability measures to arbitrary nonnegative vectors.
We assume that both agents’ perceived signal structures µ̂i satisfy the following consistency condition relative to the true signal structure µ. By standard arguments (as
in Berk, 1966), this assumption is necessary and sufficient for an agent’s belief to
converge almost surely to a point-mass on the true state as T → ∞.
Assumption 1 (Consistency). For any distinct θ, θ0 ∈ Θ, we have KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) <
KL(µθ , µ̂θ0 ).
10

We introduce the following learning efficiency index:
Definition 1. Given any true and perceived signal structures µ and µ̂, the learning
efficiency index is defined by w(µ, µ̂) := minθ w(θ, µ, µ̂), where
w(θ, µ, µ̂) := min KL(ν, µθ )

subject to

ν∈∆(X)

KL(ν, µ̂θ ) = KL(ν, µ̂θ ).

(8)

We call the constraint KL(ν, µ̂θ ) = KL(ν, µ̂θ ) the indistinguishability condition.8
To interpret, suppose that the realized empirical signal distribution ν ∈ ∆(X)
satisfies the indistinguishability condition. Then based on observing ν, the agent is
unable to tell apart the two states θ and θ, because ν comes equally close to her
perceived signal distributions in both states. The measure w(θ, µ, µ̂) captures how
“atypical” such ν are relative to the true signal distribution µθ in state θ: The greater
w(θ, µ, µ̂), the “less likely” it is that the agent will face an empirical distribution ν
that does not allow her to distinguish between θ and θ. The learning efficiency index
w(µ, µ̂) considers the worst-case over all states of the measure w(θ, µ, µ̂).
Note that the learning efficiency index is defined without reference to any decision
problem. The following theorem shows that this index characterizes the dynamic
welfare ranking. Call a decision problem A non-trivial if it does not have a dominant
act, i.e., there is no a ∈ A such that a(θ) ≥ b(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ and b ∈ A:
Theorem 1. Fix any true signal structure µ and perceived signal structures µ̂1 and
µ̂2 satisfying Assumption 1. Suppose w(µ, µ̂1 ) > w(µ, µ̂2 ). Then for any non-trivial
decision problem A, there exists T ∗ such that for all T ≥ T ∗ ,
WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) > WT (µ, µ̂2 , A).
Theorem 1 implies that the dynamic welfare ranking is generically complete in
the binary state setting: Given a true signal structure µ, any two biases µ̂1 and µ̂2
can be ranked uniformly across all non-trivial decision problems, except when their
efficiency indices w(µ, µ̂1 ) = w(µ, µ̂2 ) are exactly tied.
We prove Theorem 1 in Appendix A.2. The basic idea is as follows. By Assumption 1, both agents’ asymptotic beliefs are correct. Thus, in every decision problem,
they choose an ex-post optimal act with probability one as T → ∞. As a result,
8

Under Assumption 1, the indistinguishability condition is satisfied for some ν ∈ ∆(X).
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w(µ, µ̂i )

ci (x)
ci (x)

Figure 1: Efficiency index under asymmetric updating as a function of
µθ (x). Assumption 1 holds iff 1/4 <
KL(ν i , µθ ). When

ci (x)
ci (x)

ci (x)
ci (x)

< 4. When

ci (x)
ci (x)

ci (x)
ci (x)

when µθ (x) = 0.8 =

≤ 1, we have w(µ, µ̂i ) = w(θ, µi , µ̂) =

≥ 1, we have w(µ, µ̂i ) = w(θ, µi , µ̂) = KL(ν i , µθ ). Here ν i is given by (10).

comparing their welfare amounts to comparing the rate at which their probability of
making a suboptimal choice vanishes. The key observation is that, in each state θ and
for any decision problem, this probability vanishes at the same rate as the probability
that the empirical signal distribution ν approximately satisfies the indistinguishability condition. By applying Sanov’s theorem from large deviation theory, we show that
the latter probability vanishes exponentially as T → ∞, at a rate given by w(θ, µ, µ̂i ).
Finally, the ex-ante welfare comparison is fully determined by the state in which this
rate is lowest, i.e., by w(µ, µ̂i ) = minθ w(θ, µ, µ̂i ).
To apply Theorem 1 to specific biases, observe that an agent’s perceived signal
structure µ̂ affects the efficiency index w(µ, µ̂) only through the indistinguishability
condition. Moreover, the set of solutions to the indistinguishability condition, which
we refer to as the indistinguishability set, is given by the hyperplane
I(µ̂) := {ν ∈ ∆(X) : KL(ν, µ̂θ ) = KL(ν, µ̂θ )} = {ν ∈ ∆(X) : ν · `ˆ = 0}

(9)



µ̂θ (x)
ˆ
whose normal vector ` := log µ̂θ (x)
is the vector of perceived log-likelihood ratios
x∈X
under µ̂.
Asymmetric updating: Continuing with the illustrative example, we have
µ̂i (x)
µ (x)
µ (x)
log µ̂θi (x) = ci (x) log µθθ (x) for each agent i and signal x ∈ {x, x}. Let `(x) := log µθθ (x) .
θ

12

Then, under Assumption 1,9 agent i’s indistinguishability set (9) is a singleton, with
unique element ν i ∈ ∆(X) given by
ν i (x) =

−`(x)
−`(x) +

ci (x)
`(x)
ci (x)

.

(10)

Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the efficiency index w(µ, µ̂i ) depends on agents’ distortion
functions ci only through the ratio ci (x)/ci (x), and dynamic welfare is higher the closer
this ratio is to 1.
Remark 2. Moscarini and Smith (2002) (MS) study robust comparisons of true signal
structures for correctly specified agents. MS consider an index over signal structures
µ given by
X
µθ (x)λ µθ (x)1−λ ,
wM S (µ) := − min log
λ∈[0,1]

x

and show that if wM S (µ1 ) > wM S (µ2 ), then for any non-trivial decision problem,
a correctly specified agent’s expected payoff under µ1 is higher than under µ2 for
all large T . Using the variational formula (e.g., Dupuis and Ellis, 2011, Lemma
6.2.3(f)), one can show that w(µ, µ) = wM S (µ), i.e., our efficiency index reduces
to MS’s index when agents are correctly specified.10 Moreover, the same argument
as in Theorem 1 implies that if w(µ1 , µ̂1 ) > w(µ2 , µ̂2 ), then for all non-trivial A,
WT (µ1 , µ̂1 , A) > WT (µ2 , µ̂2 , A) for all large T . This result nests both Theorem 1
and MS’s characterization, and additionally allows for welfare comparisons across
agents who differ both in terms of the true signal structures µi they face and in their
misperceptions µ̂i .
N

3.3

Properties of the Welfare Rankings

Inconsistency between static and dynamic rankings. As the asymmetric updating example illustrates, agent 1 can be strictly better off than agent 2 according
to the static ranking, but strictly worse off according to the dynamic ranking. To
understand the source of the inconsistency in general, recall that by Proposition 1,
µ (x)

i

µ (x)

c (x)
−`(x) θ
θ
Assumption 1 holds if and only if −`(x)
`(x) µθ (x) < ci (x) < `(x) µθ (x) . Section 3.4 revisits the
example when Assumption 1 is violated.
10
Moreover, w(µ, µ) = w(θ, µ, µ) = w(θ, µ, µ) = minν∈∆(X) max{KL(ν, µθ ), KL(ν, µθ )}. That is,
our index for correctly specified agents coincides with the Chernoff information distance between
signal distributions µθ and µθ (e.g., Cover and Thomas, 2006).
9
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µ̂1 dominates µ̂2 according to the static ranking if the interpretation of each signal
under µ̂1 is closer to the correctly specified case than under µ̂2 , in the sense of the
nested likelihood ratio condition (6). Importantly, the fact that each individual signal is interpreted more accurately, does not preclude that some sequences of signals
are interpreted less accurately. The reason is that (6) allows for the possibility that
µ̂1 (x)
µ̂2 (x)
µ̂1 (y)
µ̂2 (y)
µ (y)
µθ (x)
≥ µ̂θ1 (x) ≥ µ̂θ2 (x) for some signals x, but µθθ (y) ≤ µ̂1θ (y) ≤ µ̂θ2 (y) for other signals
µθ (x)
θ
θ
θ
θ
y, so misinferences from these signals go in opposite directions. When this is the
case, then agent 2’s inferences from sequences that contain both x and y might be
more accurate than agent 1’s if agent 2’s errors “cancel out” more. Theorem 1 formalizes the sense in which such canceling out of opposite errors affects the dynamic
welfare ranking: The learning efficiency indices w(µ, µ̂i ) depend on µ̂i only through
the indistinguishability sets I(µ̂i ), but by (9), these sets depend onlyon the relative

µ̂i (x)
θ
interpretations of different signals, as captured by the normal vector log µ̂i (x) .
θ

x

By contrast, if condition (6) is strengthened to require misinferences from all
signals to go in the same direction, then there is no scope for opposite errors to cancel
out. In this case, agent 1 is robustly better off than agent 2 after any number of
signal draws, which implies both the static and dynamic welfare rankings:
Proposition 2. Suppose that
µ̂1 (x)
µ̂2 (x)
µθ (x)
≥ θ1
≥ θ2
∀x ∈ X
µθ (x)
µ̂θ (x)
µ̂θ (x)

µ̂1 (x)
µ̂2 (x)
µθ (x)
≤ 1θ
≤ θ2
∀x ∈ X.
µθ (x)
µ̂θ (x)
µ̂θ (x)

or

(11)

Then for all decision problems A and all T , WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) ≥ WT (µ, µ̂2 , A).
In the asymmetric updating example, (11) holds if and only if either c2 (x) ≥
c1 (x) ≥ 1 ≥ c1 (x) ≥ c2 (x) or c2 (x) ≤ c1 (x) ≤ 1 ≤ c1 (x) ≤ c2 (x).
Larger biases can be less harmful. Since WT (µ, µ̂, A) is the ex-ante expected
payoff according to the true signal structure µ, a correctly specified agent’s welfare
is clearly at least as high as that of any other agent in all decision problems. Thus,
by Theorem 1, w(µ, µ) ≥ w(µ, µ̂) for all perceived signal structures µ̂. However,
generalizing the asymmetric updating example, the following result shows that there
is a class of biases µ̂ 6= µ that achieve the same maximal efficiency index as the
correctly specified case: This class coincides exactly with the classical model of over/underinference due to Phillips and Edwards (1966), where all likelihood ratios are
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distorted by a constant power c,11

PE(µ) :=

µ̂ ∈

Θ
RX
++

µ̂ (x)
: ∃c > 0 s.t. θ
=
µ̂θ (x)



µθ (x)
µθ (x)

c


∀x ∈ X .

Proposition 3. For any true and perceived signal structures µ and µ̂ satisfying Assumption 1, we have w(µ, µ̂) = w(µ, µ) if and only if µ̂ ∈ PE(µ).
Proposition 3 again uses the fact that w(µ, µ̂) depends on the bias µ̂ only through
the indistinguishability set I(µ̂) given by the hyperplane (9). Thus, if µ̂ yields the
same indistinguishability set as the correctly specified case, then w(µ, µ̂) = w(µ, µ).
Conversely, we show that any bias with w(µ, µ̂) = w(µ, µ) must satisfy I(µ̂) = I(µ).
Given this, the result follows from the observation that distorting likelihood ratios by
a constant power c is the only operation thatdoes notaffect the hyperplane I(µ), as
µ (x)
it amounts to multiplying its normal vector log µθθ (x) by the constant c.
x
To interpret Proposition 3, note that w(µ, µ̂) = w(µ, µ) does not imply that
WT (µ, µ̂, A) = WT (µ, µ, A) for all large T . However, by the proof of Theorem 1,
w(µ, µ̂) = w(µ, µ) entails that in any decision problem, the probability of suboptimal choices under µ̂ and µ vanishes at the same exponential rate. Moreover, an
important implication of Proposition 3 is that “larger” biases can be robustly better
than “smaller” biases when agents observe many signal draws: Indeed, fix any bias
µ̂ ∈ PE(µ) with an arbitrarily large distortion factor c 6= 1. Consider any sequence
of biases µ̂n ∈
/ PE(µ) such that µ̂n → µ according to some arbitrary metric on signal
structures. Then by Proposition 3, w(µ, µ) = w(µ, µ̂) > w(µ, µ̂n ) for all n. Thus, the
large bias µ̂ is less harmful according to the dynamic ranking than the vanishingly
small biases µ̂n .

3.4

Dynamic Ranking: Incorrect Asymptotic Beliefs

We now consider the dynamic welfare ranking when Assumption 1 is violated, so
agents’ asymptotic beliefs may be incorrect in some states. The main insight is that,
when agents share the same asymptotic beliefs, this ranking can again be characterized using the learning efficiency index from Section 3.2, except that in states in
which mislearning occurs, agents with a lower efficiency index are better off.
11

See Benjamin (2019)(Section 5.2) for a survey of experimental evidence. Some work in behavioral
finance (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998) uses a Phillips-Edwards model with
c > 1 to capture overconfidence about signal precision.
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Suppose that at least one agent’s perceived signal structure µ̂ ∈ {µ̂1 , µ̂2 } violates
Assumption 1 in one of the following three ways:
• Case (i): KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) < KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) and KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) < KL(µθ , µ̂θ ).
• Case (ii): KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) > KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) and KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) > KL(µθ , µ̂θ ).
• Case (iii): KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) < KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) and KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) > KL(µθ , µ̂θ ).
Case (i) obtains if and only if the agent’s belief almost surely converges to a pointmass on state θ in both states, so mislearning occurs in state θ. Similarly, in case
(ii), mislearning occurs in state θ. Finally, in case (iii), mislearning occurs in both
states.12
We focus on comparing dynamic welfare when agents 1 and 2 share the same
asymptotic beliefs. If agents’ asymptotic beliefs are different, it is straightforward to
determine the dynamic welfare ranking based on these different beliefs: Specifically,
if agent 1 satisfies Assumption 1 (correctly learns in both states), but agent 2 does
not, then for any non-trivial decision problem A, WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) > WT (µ, µ̂2 , A) for all
sufficiently large T . The same is true if agent 1 satisfies case (i) or (ii), but agent 2
satisfies case (iii). Finally, if agent 1 satisfies case (i) but agent 2 satisfies case (ii) (or
vice versa), then which agent’s welfare is higher depends on the decision problem A
and prior p0 .
When agents’ asymptotic beliefs are the same, the following result shows that
the dynamic welfare ranking is again generically complete and is characterized by
the state-dependent efficiency indices w(θ, µ, µ̂i ). To ensure that these indices are
well-defined, we impose an assumption on both agents that guarantees that their
indistinguishability sets are nonempty. This assumption is always satisfied for misspecified Bayesian agents (i.e., if µ̂θ ∈ ∆(X) for all θ) and rules out extreme forms of
non-Bayesian learning:13
Assumption 2 (Non-degeneracy). For each θ ∈ Θ, there exists ν ∈ ∆(X) such that
KL(ν, µ̂θ ) < KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) for all θ0 6= θ.
12

We do not consider the case when Assumption 1 is violated with equality, i.e., KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) =
KL(µθ , µ̂θ0 ) for some θ 6= θ0 . For any such bias µ̂, beliefs in state θ a.s. cycle indefinitely, which leads
to lower dynamic welfare than correct learning but higher dynamic welfare than incorrect learning.
13
Under binary states, the assumption rules out non-Bayesian biases for which all signal realizations lead an agent to update her belief in the same direction.
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Theorem 2. Fix µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfying Assumption 2. Suppose one of the following
is true:
1. Both µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfy case (i) and


min w(θ, µ, µ̂2 ), w(θ, µ, µ̂1 ) < min w(θ, µ, µ̂1 ), w(θ, µ, µ̂2 ) .
2. Both µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfy case (ii) and


min w(θ, µ, µ̂1 ), w(θ, µ, µ̂2 ) < min w(θ, µ, µ̂2 ), w(θ, µ, µ̂1 ) .
3. Both µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfy case (iii) and w(µ, µ̂1 ) < w(µ, µ̂2 ).
Then for any non-trivial decision problem A, there exists T ∗ such that for all T ≥ T ∗ ,
WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) > WT (µ, µ̂2 , A).
To understand the result, consider the first possibility, where both agents’ asymptotic beliefs are always a point-mass on θ. Then in state θ, both agents choose an
ex-post optimal act in the long run, so in this case a faster rate of convergence,
i.e., a higher efficiency index w(θ, µ, µ̂), is better for welfare. However, in state θ,
both agents choose the same ex-post suboptimal act in the long run, so in this case
slower convergence, i.e., a lower w(θ, µ, µ̂), is better for welfare. Thus, if both (a)
w(θ, µ, µ̂2 ) < w(θ, µ, µ̂1 ) and (b) w(θ, µ, µ̂1 ) < w(θ, µ, µ̂2 ), then agent 1 is better off.
Theorem 2 shows that the same conclusion obtains under a weaker condition that
only compares the minima of both sides of inequalities (a) and (b).
Asymmetric updating: Returning to the illustrative example, again let `(x) :=
i
µ (x)
µθ (x)
log µθθ (x) . Here, both agents satisfy case (i) iff cci (x)
> −`(x)
, and agents satisfy case
(x)
`(x) µθ (x)
i

µ (x)

(x)
θ
(ii) iff cci (x)
< −`(x)
. Case (iii) cannot arise. Assumption 2 holds as all distortion
`(x) µθ (x)
i
factors c (x) are positive. As in Section 3.2, each agent’s indistinguishability condition
has a unique solution ν i given by (10). This again implies that the efficiency indices
in each state depend on µ̂i only through the ratio ci (x)/ci (x). Figure 2 plots the
efficiency indices as a function of ci (x)/ci (x) and shows that, just as under correct
learning, higher dynamic welfare in case (i) and (ii) corresponds to the ratio ci (x)/ci (x)
being closer to 1.
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w(θ, µ, µ̂i )

w(θ, µ, µ̂i )
ci (x)
ci (x)

Figure 2:
0.8 = µθ (x).

Efficiency indices w(θ, µ, µ̂i ) and w(θ, µ, µ̂i ) as a function of
The case when 1/4 <

i

c (x)
ci (x)

ci (x)
ci (x)

when µθ (x) =

< 4 (correct learning) was discussed in Figure 1.

Case (i) (mislearning in state θ) corresponds to

ci (x)
ci (x)

> 4. As depicted, for any µ̂, µ̂0 in this re-

gion, w(θ, µ, µ̂) < w(θ, µ, µ̂0 ). Thus, by Theorem 2 each agent’s dynamic welfare is determined by
i
(x)
w(θ, µ, µ̂i ) and is higher the lower w(θ, µ, µ̂i ), i.e., the smaller the ratio cci (x)
. Analogously, case
(ii) (mislearning in state θ) corresponds to
i

w(θ, µ, µ̂ ), i.e., the greater

3.5

ci (x)
ci (x)

< 1/4, and in this case welfare is higher the lower

ci (x)
ci (x) .

Examples

We present two additional examples that illustrate how our approach can be used
to understand the welfare implications of commonly studied learning biases. While
existing work on these biases has focused on asymptotic beliefs, our results highlight
their effect on short-/medium-run beliefs. For simplicity, we assume binary signals,
X = {x, x} with µθ (x) > µθ (x).
First, we provide an example of a bias for which a natural parametric quantification of its severity is consistent with both the static and dynamic welfare rankings:
Example 1 (Partisan Bias). Consider non-Bayesian updating under “partisan bias,”
µ̂i (x)
µ (x)
where agents i = 1, 2 satisfy µ̂θi (x) = η i (x) µθθ (x) , for some distortion functions η i (·) with
θ

η 2 (x) > η 1 (x) > 1 for all x.14 That is, both agents distort inferences from all signals
in the direction of the “high” state θ (e.g., the superiority of a right-wing political
policy), but agent 2’s bias is more severe.
14

See, e.g., Bohren and Hauser (2018); Thaler (2019) and references therein to applications of the
model in political science.
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µ (x)

µ̂1 (x)

µ̂2 (x)

Note that µθθ (x) < µ̂1θ (x) < µ̂θ2 (x) for all x. Hence, Proposition 2 implies that in
θ
θ
every decision problem, agent 2 is worse off than agent 1 for all T . This shows that,
regardless of whether or not agents’ asymptotic beliefs are correct, more severe forms
of partisan bias are always robustly welfare-decreasing in both static and dynamic
settings, because they lead to every sequence of signals being interpreted less accurately.
N
Next, we consider overconfidence. We show that more severe overconfidence need
not be worse according to the static ranking, but is robustly more harmful according
to the dynamic ranking:
Example 2 (Overconfidence). Suppose agents i = 1, 2 are misspecified Bayesians
with µ̂i ∈ ∆(X) and µ̂2θ (x) > µ̂1θ (x) > µθ (x) for each θ. That is, interpreting signal
x as “success” and x as “failure,” both agents are overconfident, in the sense that
they overestimate success probabilities in all states, but agent 2’s bias is more severe. Assume that agents’ perceptions also satisfy µ̂iθ (x) > µ̂iθ (x), which implies the
comonotonic likelihood ratio property (7).
For the static welfare ranking, observe that the fact that µ̂2θ (x) > µ̂1θ (x) > µθ (x) for
all θ does not imply condition (6). That is, more overconfident agents may interpret
some signals more accurately. Hence, by Proposition 1 and (7), if only a single signal
is observed, there may be decision problems in which the more overconfident agent 2
performs strictly better.
For the dynamic ranking, note that for each i = 1, 2, there is a unique distribution
P
µ̂i (x)
ν i ∈ ∆(X) satisfying the indistinguishability condition x=x,x ν i (x) log µ̂iθ (x) = 0. A
θ
straightforward calculation shows that
ν ∗ (x) < ν 1 (x) < ν 2 (x),

(12)

where ν ∗ is the indistinguishable distribution in the correctly specified case. Intuitively, because an overconfident agent overestimates the probability of high signals
in both states, the signal distribution that makes her unable to distinguish between
θ and θ must also feature a larger fraction of high signals relative to the correctly
specified case, and more so the greater the agent’s overconfidence.
This implies that, in any decision problem, the more overconfident agent 2 is
worse off if sufficiently many signals are observed. When agent 2 mislearns (i.e.,
converges to a point-mass on θ in both states) but agent 1 learns the state correctly,
19

the welfare loss is driven by the difference in asymptotic beliefs, which have been the
focus of much existing work (e.g., Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack, 2018). However,
by Theorems 1–2, agent 2 is worse off even when both agents’ asymptotic beliefs are
the same (either both correct or both incorrect): This is because (12) implies that
greater overconfidence increases the probability of suboptimal choices in the medium
run.15
N

4

Extensions

We extend the analysis to general finite state spaces (Section 4.1) and to settings with
uncertainty about the signal structure (Section 4.2). In the latter case, we show that
misspecified agents can outperform correctly specified but uncertain agents according
to the dynamic welfare ranking.

4.1

General States

Consider a general finite state space Θ. We focus on extending the characterization
of the dynamic welfare ranking.16 Under binary states, Theorems 1–2 showed that
the learning efficiency index yields a generically complete ranking over biases that
induce the same asymptotic beliefs. With more than two states, a complete ranking
is no longer possible. Indeed, consider any non-trivial decision problem A in which
the optimal acts in states θ and θ0 are the same. Then any bias that only affects
inferences between states θ and θ0 is payoff-irrelevant in A, but may affect welfare in
decision problems for which the optimal acts in states θ and θ0 differ.
However, we show that, up to controlling for such “redundancy” of payoff-equivalent
states, the learning efficiency index can be generalized to again yield a generically
complete ranking. Formally, given any decision problem A, we divide the state space
into equivalence classes that share the same ex-post optimal act. That is, we consider
the partition SA over Θ whose cells are
SA (θ) := {θ0 ∈ Θ : argmax a(θ0 ) = argmax a(θ)} for each θ.
a∈A

a∈A

The reasoning is analogous to the asymmetric updating example with ci (x)/ci (x) ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2.
For the static ranking, a sufficient condition for µ̂1 to be less harmful than µ̂2 is that after each
signal, the interim belief under µ̂1 is a convex combination of the beliefs under µ and under µ̂2 ,
analogous to Section 3.1.
15

16
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We then extend the learning efficiency index to rank welfare across all decision problems A that induce the same partition SA . Given any partition S over Θ, we define
the S-learning efficiency index by w(µ, µ̂, S) := minθ w(θ, µ, µ̂, S), where
w(θ, µ, µ̂, S) := min KL(ν, µθ )

subject to

ν∈∆(X)

min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) = 0min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ).

θ0 ∈S(θ)

θ 6∈S(θ)

Generalizing Definition 1, the indistinguishability condition minθ0 ∈S(θ) KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) =
minθ0 6∈S(θ) KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) in state θ now captures the set of empirical distributions ν based
on which the agent is unable to distinguish whether the state is in S(θ) or Θ\S(θ). As
before, w(θ, µ, µ̂, S) measures how unlikely such empirical distributions ν are under
the true signal distribution µθ , and the learning efficiency index w(µ, µ̂, S) considers
the worst-case measure across all states.
The following condition generalizes Assumption 1. Given a partition S of Θ, we
require that in each state θ, the agent asymptotically assigns probability one to the
correct cell S(θ). However, the condition does not restrict the agent’s asymptotic
beliefs over states in S(θ), allowing for some forms of mislearning:
Assumption 3 (S-consistency). For every θ ∈ Θ, we have minθ0 ∈S(θ) KL(µθ , µ̂θ0 ) <
minθ00 ∈S(θ)
KL(µθ , µ̂θ00 ).
/
Under Assumption 3, we obtain the following generalization of Theorem 1: The
S-efficiency index characterizes when agent 1’s welfare exceeds agent 2’s welfare in
all decision problems with partition S. We focus on perceived signal structures that
are non-degenerate in the sense of Assumption 2, and on regular decision problems
A, where a(θ) 6= a0 (θ) for all θ and distinct a, a0 ∈ A.
Theorem 3. Let S be a partition over Θ. Fix any true signal structure µ and perceived signal structures µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfying Assumptions 2–3. Suppose w(µ, µ̂1 , S) >
w(µ, µ̂2 , S). Then for any non-trivial and regular decision problem A with SA = S,
there exists T ∗ such that for all T ≥ T ∗ , WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) > WT (µ, µ̂2 , A).
Thus, up to restricting to decision problems that feature the same classes of equivalent states, the dynamic welfare ranking is again (generically) complete.17 As in
17

Analogous to Remark 2, Theorem 3 likewise extends to the case where both the true signal
structure µi and perceived signal structures µ̂i differ across agents. This result nests the general
state characterization for the correctly specified case in Moscarini and Smith (2002), who restrict
attention to decision problems A for which the optimal act in each state is different. Moscarini and
Smith’s (2002) proof approach relies on correctly specified agents.

21

Section 3.3, biases of the Philipps-Edwards form achieve the maximal efficiency index
for any partition S.

4.2

Learning about Signal Structures

Consider an agent who learns about both payoff-relevant states and signal structures.
This can be interpreted as capturing some “cautiousness” against misspecification. We
extend the dynamic welfare ranking to this setting. Relative to the baseline model
without uncertainty about signal structures, a key difference is that now correctly
specified agents can be robustly worse off than misspecified agents.
As in Section 2, there is a finite set Θ of payoff-relevant states from which the
true state is drawn according to a full-support distribution p0 , and a fixed true signal
structure µ := (µθ )θ∈Θ . The agent learns jointly about payoff-relevant states and
signal structures, under a possibly misspecified model that may assign zero probability
to the true signal structure: Let M̂ denote the set of signal structures the agent deems
possible, where µ̂ := (µθ ) ∈ (∆(X))Θ for each µ̂ ∈ M̂ .18 The agent’s prior belief is
some full-support q0 ∈ ∆(M̂ × Θ). The agent is correctly specified if the true signal
structure µ ∈ M̂ . Upon observing a signal sequence xT = (x1 , x2 , · · · , xT ), generated
i.i.d. according to the true signal structure, the agent Bayesian-updates her belief to
T

qT (µ̂, θ | x ) = P

QT

t=1 µ̂θ (xt )
QT
0 0
t=1
(µ̂0 ,θ0 )∈M̂ ×Θ q0 (µ̂ , θ )

q0 (µ̂, θ)

µ̂0θ0 (xt )

.

(13)

Given any decision problem A ⊆ RΘ , the agent chooses a subjectively optimal act according to her posterior belief margΘ qT over payoff-relevant states, where as before, we
assume away indifferences. Analogous to (5), define the agent’s welfare WT (µ, q0 , A)
as her objective expected payoff according to the true signal structure µ and prior p0
over Θ.
For simplicity, we focus on binary payoff-relevant states, Θ = {θ, θ}, and we
restrict attention to agents who correctly learn the payoff-relevant state, as is ensured
by imposing Assumption 1 on each µ̂ ∈ M̂ :
Assumption 4. For any distinct θ, θ0 ∈ Θ and each µ̂ ∈ M̂ , we have KL(µθ , µ̂θ ) <
KL(µθ , µ̂θ0 ).
18

We assume that each perceived signal distribution µ̂θ ∈ ∆(X) is a probability measure, but the
same analysis extends to the case where µ̂θ ∈ RX
++ , subject to imposing an analog of Assumption 2.
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Figure 3: Under certainty about the true signal structure µ, the indistinguishable distribution is
(1/2, 1/2). However, for µ̂1 as shown, a correctly specified but uncertain agent with M̂ 1 = {µ, µ̂1 }
has indistinguishable distribution ν 1 6= (1/2, 1/2). The efficiency index is w(µ, M̂ 1 ) = w(µ, µ̂1 ) <
w(µ, µ).

We obtain the following generalization of Theorem 1. Define the learning efficiency index by w(µ, M̂ ) := minθ w(θ, µ, M̂ ), where
w(θ, µ, M̂ ) := min KL(ν, µθ )

subject to

ν∈∆(X)

min KL(ν, µ̂θ ) = min KL(ν, µ̂θ ).

µ̂∈M̂

µ̂∈M̂

The indistinguishability condition minµ̂∈M̂ KL(ν, µ̂θ ) = minµ̂∈M̂ KL(ν, µθ ) again captures the empirical signal distributions ν that do not allow the agent to tell apart
states θ and θ. Here, in each state θ, the agent uses the signal distribution µ̂θ that
comes closest to ν among all the distributions she deems possible. Note that the
agent’s prior belief over signal structures in M̂ does not affect the efficiency index.
When M̂ is a singleton, the index reduces to the one in Definition 1.
Theorem 4. Fix any µ, M̂ 1 , and M̂ 2 satisfying Assumption 4. Suppose w(µ, M̂ 1 ) >
w(µ, M̂ 2 ). Then for any q0i ∈ ∆(M̂ i × Θ) (i = 1, 2) and any non-trivial decision
problem A, there exists T ∗ such that for all T ≥ T ∗ , WT (µ, q01 , A) > WT (µ, q02 , A).
A key implication of Theorem 4 is that correctly specified but uncertain agents
can be robustly worse off than misspecified agents. Indeed, the following example
exhibits M̂ 1 , M̂ 2 such that µ ∈ M̂ 1 \ M̂ 2 but w(µ, M̂ 2 ) > w(µ, M̂ 1 ). Thus, in any
decision problem, the correctly specified agent 1’s welfare is strictly lower than that
of the misspecified agent 2 after sufficiently many signal observations. Note that both
agents learn the true payoff-relevant state θ asymptotically, but agent 1 is worse off
because her beliefs converge more slowly.
Example 3 (Correctly specified agents can be worse off). Suppose X = {x, x} and
the true signal structure satisfies µθ (x) = µθ (x). Then if M̂ = {µ}, i.e., the agent is
23

certain of the true signal structure, the learning efficiency index is maximal. Moreover, by symmetry of µ, the indistinguishability set in this case consists of the single
distribution ν = (1/2, 1/2).
The key observation is that if an agent is correctly specified but uncertain about
the signal structure, this may reduce her efficiency index by altering her indistinguishability set. For example, as illustrated in Figure 3, suppose M̂ 1 = {µ, µ̂1 },
where µ̂1 is asymmetric and µθ (x) < µ̂1θ (x) < µ̂1θ (x) < µθ (x). Then the unique
indistinguishable distribution is ν 1 6= (1/2, 1/2) and w(µ, M̂ 1 ) = w(µ, µ̂1 ) < w(µ, µ).
By contrast, consider any misspecified agent with a unique indistinguishable distribution ν 2 that is closer to (1/2, 1/2) than ν 1 . For example, suppose M̂ 2 = {µ̂2 },
where µ̂2 is symmetric but different from µ, so that ν 2 = (1/2, 1/2). Then w(µ, M̂ 2 ) =
w(µ, µ) > w(µ, M̂ 1 ).
N
This example highlights a rationale for why larger subjective models M̂ , i.e.,
greater “caution,” can reduce an agent’s welfare: Entertaining an additional possible
signal structure may lead to more medium-run mistakes, by increasing the probability
of observing signal sequences that make it impossible to distinguish between different
states. At the same time, learning under any model M̂ at least outperforms learning
under the worst signal structure µ̂ in its support:
Proposition 4. Fix any µ and M̂ satisfying Assumption 4. Then
w(µ, M̂ ) ≥ min w(µ, µ̂).
µ̂∈M̂

We also note that it is not in general true that w(µ, M̂ ) ≤ maxµ̂∈M̂ w(µ, µ̂). That
is, in some cases, entertaining uncertainty over multiple misspecified signal structures
can robustly outperform learning under each individual signal structure.19

5

Concluding Remarks

This paper conducts a robust comparison of objective welfare across different learning biases. Our core results characterize this welfare comparison in dynamic settings,
For example, consider µ and µ̂1 as in Figure 3. Suppose µ̂2 is such that µ̂2θ (x) and µ̂1θ (x) (resp.
µ̂2θ (x) and µ̂1θ (x)) are symmetric about (1/2, 1/2). Then the unique indistinguishable distribution
19

under M̂ = {µ̂1 , µ̂2 } is (1/2, 1/2). Thus, w(µ, M̂ ) = w(µ, µ) > w(µ, µ̂i ) for i = 1, 2.
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using a learning efficiency index: Complementing a focus in the literature on asymptotic beliefs, this index determines the speed of belief convergence under each bias,
by quantifying the likelihood with which agents encounter signal sequences that do
not allow them to distinguish different states. We highlight that learning efficiency
can be strictly lower for smaller biases or for biases that are less harmful in static
settings, and that correctly specified but uncertain agents can be outperformed by
misspecified agents. We apply our results to provide welfare-founded quantifications
of the severity of various commonly studied biases.
There are several directions in which to extend our analysis. First, beyond the
focus on exogenous i.i.d. signals in this paper, it is natural to consider settings with (i)
intertemporally correlated signals or (ii) endogenous signals. For (i), it is straightforward to extend the dynamic characterization based on learning efficiency to exogenous
but Markovian signals, by invoking appropriate generalizations of Sanov’s theorem.
This extension can accommodate biases about the intertemporal correlation of signals, e.g., the gambler’s and hot-hand fallacies (Rabin and Vayanos, 2010). For (ii),
our companion note (in preparation) extends the dynamic welfare analysis to simple
settings in which the agent’s current belief can affect the true and perceived signal
distributions, capturing some forms of misspecified active learning or belief-dependent
updating (e.g., confirmation bias). One finding is that such endogenous signals always
lead to lower learning efficiency than the corresponding exogenous signal structures.
Second, we have focused on learning biases that can be represented as Bayesian
updating under some possibly incorrect perception of signal likelihoods. Important
features of this setting are that (i) agents’ posterior beliefs depend only on the empirical signal distribution (rather than the exact signal sequence), and (ii) for almost
all empirical signal distributions, agents’ posteriors become confident in a particular
state as T → ∞. The large deviation techniques on which our dynamic characterization relies can also be used to conduct dynamic welfare comparisons for other
non-Bayesian learning models that share these features.20
Finally, our analysis can serve as a starting point to investigate the welfare implications of some design interventions for biased learning. As an illustration, consider
20

For example, in Cripps (2018), the agent distorts beliefs based on some homeomorphism F :
∆(Θ) → ∆(Θ) before performing Bayesian updating, and then applies the inverse map F −1 to the
updated belief before making a decision. Assuming that F maps each point-mass belief to itself (to
guarantee that asymptotic beliefs are correct), similar arguments as in Theorem 1 imply that this
bias has the same learning efficiency index as the correctly specified case.
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µ, µ̂
x0
x1
x2
θ
0.3, 0.1 0.4, 0.5 0.3, 0.4
θ
0.4, 0.3 0.5, 0.6 0.1, 0.1

µ0 , µ̂0
θ
θ

{x0 , x1 }
0.7, 0.6
0.9, 0.9

{x2 }
0.3, 0.4
0.1, 0.1

Figure 4: Suppose X = {x0 , x1 , x2 } with x0 < x1 < x2 . Left: True and perceived signal
distributions µ, µ̂ before coarsening; the agent is overconfident, in the sense that µ̂θ ≥FOSD µθ for
all θ. Right: True and perceived signal distributions µ0 , µ̂0 after coarsening signals by bunching
together x0 and x1 . Before coarsening, the efficiency index is w(µ, µ̂) = w(θ, µ, µ̂) ≈ 0.00009. After
coarsening, the index increases to w(µ0 , µ̂0 ) = w(θ, µ0 , µ̂0 ) ≈ 0.013. Thus, by the generalization of
Theorem 1 in Remark 2, coarsening increases dynamic welfare.

the effect of coarsening signals, i.e., partitioning the signal space X and only revealing
the realized cell to the agent. For correctly specified agents, coarsening signals always
reduces welfare. However, for a misspecified Bayesian agent, our results imply that
some forms of coarsening can robustly improve welfare in dynamic settings, by shifting the agent’s indistinguishability set closer to the correctly specified case. Figure 4
provides a concrete example.21

21
In general, the effect of coarsening on learning efficiency can be decomposed as follows. Let µ,
µ̂ (resp. µ0 , µ̂0 ) denote the true and perceived signal structures before (resp. after) coarsening. Then

w(µ0 , µ̂0 ) − w(µ, µ̂) = [w(µ0 , µ0 ) − w(µ, µ)] + [w(µ, µ) − w(µ, µ̂)] − [w(µ0 , µ0 ) − w(µ0 , µ̂0 )] .
|
{z
} |
{z
}
information loss

difference in welfare costs of misperceptions

The first term captures the information loss due to coarsening and is always negative. The second
term compares the extent of welfare loss due to misperception before and after coarsening. This term
can be positive and overwhelm the first term if the welfare loss before coarsening, w(µ, µ) − w(µ, µ̂),
is sufficiently larger than the welfare loss after coarsening, w(µ0 , µ0 ) − w(µ0 , µ̂0 ).
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A

Proofs

A.1

Proof of Proposition 1

We prove a slight generalization of Proposition 1 that allows decision problems to
feature ties: For each decision problem A, we assume some arbitrary strict total order
A over A such that whenever (4) admits multiple solutions for an agent, she chooses
the A -optimal act among these solutions. Note that both agents are assumed to use
the same tie-breaking rule.
Suppose that (6) holds for all x ∈ X. Fix any decision problem A. For each
realized signal x, let px denote the posterior belief under µ, and p̂ix denote the posterior
belief under µ̂i (i = 1, 2). Let aix ∈ argmaxa∈A a · p̂ix denote the action chosen by agent
i (with tie-breaking according to A in case of indifference).
By (6) and the fact that Θ = {θ, θ} is binary, there is βx ∈ [0, 1] such that
p̂1x = βx px + (1 − βx )p̂2x . Thus, for all a ∈ A,
a · p̂1x = βx a · px + (1 − βx )a · p̂2x .

(14)

a1x · px ≥ a2x · px .

(15)

We claim that

Indeed, if βx = 0, then by (14), both agents share the same interim payoffs. Thus,
a1x = a2x (using the assumption that agents follow the same same tie-breaking rule),
which implies (15). If βx > 0, then (15) follows from (14) combined with the fact
that
a1x · p̂1x ≥ a2x · p̂1x and a1x · p̂2x ≤ a2x · p̂2x .
Since (15) holds for all x, this ensures
W1 (µ, µ̂1 , A) =

X

p0 (θ)

X

θ

x

X

p0 (θ)

X

≥

θ

µθ (x)a1x · px
µθ (x)a2x · px = W1 (µ, µ̂2 , A).

x

For the converse direction, assume that µ, µ̂1 , µ̂2 satisfy the comonotonic likelihood
ratio property with respect to some linear order > on X. Suppose that (6) is violated
at some x∗ ∈ X. We will construct a decision problem A such that W1 (µ, µ̂1 , A) <
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W1 (µ, µ̂2 , A).
Let `i (x) :=

µ̂i (x)
θ

and `(x) :=

µ̂iθ (x)
2 ∗

µθ (x)
µθ (x)

for each x. Since (6) is violated at x∗ , we either

have (i) `1 (x∗ ) > ` (x ) and `1 (x∗ ) > `(x∗ ), or (ii) `1 (x∗ ) < `2 (x∗ ) and `1 (x∗ ) < `(x∗ ).
We consider only case (i), as the argument for case (ii) is analogous. Take any
`∗ ∈ (max{`(x∗ ), `2 (x∗ )}, `1 (x∗ )). The comonotonic likelihood ratio property ensures
that for each i = 1, 2, we have `(x), `i (x) > `∗ if x > x∗ , while we have `(x), `i (x) < `∗
if x < x∗ .
Consider a decision problem A = {a, a} such that aθ − aθ > 0 > aθ − aθ and
(θ)
(aθ − aθ )`∗ pp00 (θ)
+ aθ − aθ = 0. Let ax (resp. aix ) denote the act that maximizes the
conditional expected payoff according to µ (resp. µ̂i ) at signal x. By construction,
ax = a1x = a2x = a for x > x∗ , ax = a1x = a2x = a for x < x∗ , but ax = a2x = a 6= a = a1x
for x = x∗ . This implies W1 (µ, µ, A) = W1 (µ, µ̂2 , A) > W1 (µ, µ̂1 , A), as desired.

A.2

Proof of Theorems 1 and 3

Below, we prove Theorem 3. Theorem 1 follows immediately from Theorem 3: Indeed,
Assumption 1 implies Assumptions 2–3; moreover, for binary states, it is without loss
of generality to focus on regular decision problems.22
Section A.2.1 first analyzes an agent’s choices over pairs of acts, while Section A.2.2
considers general decision problems. Section A.2.3 proves Theorem 3.
A.2.1

Binary comparisons over acts

Consider an agent with perceived signal structure µ̂. Fix any acts a and a0 . Define
the set of states where a is preferred to a0 ex-post by
Θaa0 := {θ ∈ Θ : aθ > a0θ }.
Let log µ̂θ := (log µ̂θ (x))x∈X ∈ RX . For any ε ∈ R, define
ε
Caa
0




:=

ν ∈ ∆(X) : max ν · log µ̂θ ≥ max ν · log µ̂θ + ε .
θ∈Θaa0

θ∈Θa0 a

Letting νt denote the empirical signal distribution following t draws of signals,
To see the latter, suppose A is not regular. Then some distinct acts a, a0 ∈ A have the same
payoff in some state. When Θ is binary, this implies a ≥ a0 or a0 ≥ a. Then removing the dominated
act does not change the agent’s choices since her posterior after every signal history has full support.
22

28

observe that the agent’s posterior can be expressed as
pt (θ) = P

etνt ·log µ̂θ +log p0 (θ)
,
tνt ·log µ̂θ0 +log p0 (θ0 )
θ0 e

∀θ.

(16)

Given this, the following lemma shows that for large t, the set of empirical signal
ε
distributions under which the agent prefers a to a0 can be bounded using Caa
0:
Lemma 1. Fix any ε > 0 and acts a, a0 with neither a ≥ a0 nor a0 ≥ a. There exists
t such that for all t ≥ t,
(
ε
Caa
0 ⊆

)

ν ∈ ∆(X) :

X

(aθ − a0θ )etν·log µ̂θ +log p0 (θ) > 0

θ∈Θ

)

(
⊆

ν ∈ ∆(X) :

X

(aθ − a0θ )etν·log µ̂θ +log p0 (θ) ≥ 0

−ε
⊆ Caa
0.

θ∈Θ

Proof. Since neither a ≥ a0 nor a0 ≥ a, both Θaa0 and Θa0 a are nonempty. Thus,
there exists a sufficienctly large K > 0 such that
1
≤ min (aθ − a0θ ), min (a0θ − aθ ),
θ∈Θaa0
θ∈Θa0 a
K
K ≥ max (aθ − a0θ ), max (a0θ − aθ ).
θ∈Θa0 a

θ∈Θaa0

Pick t such that

1 tε
p0 (θ)
e min
− |Θ|K > 0.
0
K θ,θ ∈Θ p0 (θ0 )

ε
To show the first desired inclusion, note that for any ν ∈ Caa
0 and t ≥ t,

P

θ∈Θ

≥

(aθ − a0θ )etν·log µ̂θ +log p0 (θ)
X
1 X tν·log µ̂θ +log p0 (θ)
e
−K
etν·log µ̂θ +log p0 (θ)
K θ∈Θ
θ∈Θ
aa0

≥
≥

a0 a

1
t(maxθ∈Θ
ν·log µ̂θ −ε)+maxθ log p0 (θ)
aa0
max etν·log µ̂θ +log p0 (θ) − |Θ|Ke
K θ∈Θaa0


1
p0 (θ)
ν·log µ̂θ +maxθ log p0 (θ)
t maxθ∈Θ
−tε
0
aa
e
min
− |Θ|Ke
> 0.
K θ,θ0 p0 (θ0 )
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−ε
Likewise, to show the final inclusion, note that for any ν ∈
/ Caa
0 and t ≥ t,

P

θ∈Θ

≤

(aθ − a0θ )etν·log µ̂θ +log p0 (θ)
X
1
K
etν·log µ̂θ +p0 (θ) −
K
θ∈Θ
aa0

≤
≤
=

X

etν·log µ̂θ +log p0 (θ)

θ∈Θa0 a

1
max etν·log µ̂θ +log p0 (θ)
θ∈Θ
K
a0 a
1
ν·log µ̂θ +minθ log p0 (θ)
t maxθ∈Θ 0
ν·log µ̂θ −ε)+maxθ log p0 (θ)
t(maxθ∈Θ 0
a a
a a
− e
K|Θ|e
K


1
p0 (θ)
t maxθ∈Θ 0 ν·log µ̂θ +maxθ log p0 (θ)
−tε
a
a
e
K|Θ|e − min0
< 0.
K θ,θ p0 (θ0 )
t maxθ∈Θ

K|Θ|e

aa0

ν·log µ̂θ +maxθ log p0 (θ)

−

Lemma 2. Suppose that neither a ≥ a0 nor a0 ≥ a and that Assumption 2 is satisfied.
ε
Then for each θ∗ ∈ Θ, minν∈Caa
KL(ν, µθ∗ ) is well-defined and continuous in ε in a
0
neighborhood of ε = 0.
Proof. Since a  a0 and a0  a, Θaa0 , Θa0 a are both nonempty. By Assumption 2,
ε
ε
Caa
0 is nonempty for ε close to 0. Since Caa0 is compact and KL(·, µθ ∗ ) is continuous (as
ε
µθ∗ has full support), minν∈Caa
KL(ν, µθ∗ ) is well-defined for all ε in a neighborhood
0
of 0.
ε
We now verify that Caa
0 is a continuous correspondence at ε = 0, which ensures
ε
that minν∈Caa
KL(ν, µθ∗ ) is continuous in ε at ε = 0 by Berge’s theorem of the
0
ε
maximum. It is straightforward to prove that Caa
0 is upper-hemicontinuous in ε.
ε
0
To see that Caa
0 is also lower-hemicontinuous at ε = 0, take any ν ∈ Caa0 and any
εn
sequence εn → 0. If maxθ∈Θaa0 ν · log µ̂θ > maxθ∈Θa0 a ν · log µ̂θ , then ν ∈ Caa
0 for
n sufficiently large. Thus, assume maxθ∈Θaa0 ν · log µ̂θ = maxθ∈Θa0 a ν · log µ̂θ . Pick
any θ0 ∈ argmaxθ∈Θaa0 ν · log µ̂θ . Then ν · θ0 = maxθ∈Θa0 a ν · log µ̂θ . Moreover, by
Assumption 2, there exists ν 0 ∈ ∆(X) such that
ν 0 · log µ̂θ0 > max ν 0 · log µ̂θ .
θ∈Θa0 a

Thus, for n sufficiently large, there exists κn ∈ [0, 1] such that limn→∞ κn → 1 and
(κn ν + (1 − κn )ν 0 ) · log µ̂θ0 = max (κn ν + (1 − κn )ν 0 ) · log µ̂θ + |εn |.
θ∈Θa0 a
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εn
0
Then (κn ν + (1 − κn )ν 0 ) ∈ Caa
0 and limn→∞ (κn ν + (1 − κn )ν ) = ν. This establishes
lower hemicontinuity.

Finally, we use Sanov’s theorem to characterize the rate (possibly zero) at which
the probability of choosing a over a0 vanishes as t → ∞:
Lemma 3. Suppose that neither a ≥ a0 nor a0 ≥ a and that Assumption 2 is satisfied.
For any state θ,
1
1
log Pθ [{pt · (a − a0 ) > 0}] = − lim log Pθ [{pt · (a − a0 ) ≥ 0}]
t→∞
t
t
= min KL(ν, µθ ) subject to
min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) ≤ 0 min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ).
0

− lim

t→∞

θ ∈Θaa0

ν∈∆(X)

θ ∈Θa0 a

Proof. For any ε > 0, Lemma 1 and (16) implies that
lim inf
t→∞

1
1
ε
log Pθ [{νt ∈ Caa
log Pθ [{pt · (a − a0 ) > 0}]
0 }] ≤ lim inf
t→∞
t
t
1
≤ lim sup log Pθ [{pt · (a − a0 ) ≥ 0}]
t→∞ t
1
−ε
≤ lim sup log Pθ [{νt ∈ Caa
0 }].
t
t→∞

ε
Pick any ε > 0 small enough that Caa
0 is nonempty, which exists by Lemma 2.
Sanov’s theorem (e.g., Dembo and Zeitouni, 2010) yields the following inequalities:

lim inf

1
ε
log Pθ [{νt ∈ Caa
inf
KL(ν, µθ ) = − infε KL(ν, µθ ),
0 }] ≥ −
ε
ν∈Caa0
t
ν∈int(Caa
0)

lim sup

1
−ε
log Pθ [{νt ∈ Caa
KL(ν, µθ ).
0 }] ≤ − inf
−ε
t
ν∈Caa
0

t→∞

t→∞

In the first line, int denotes the interior of a set and the equality follows from the
continuity of KL(ν, µθ ) in ν (as µθ has full support). Thus, taking the limit as ε → 0
and applying Lemma 2, we obtain:
1
1
log Pθ [{pt · (a − a0 ) > 0}] = − lim log Pθ [{pt · (a − a0 ) ≥ 0}] = min
KL(ν, µθ )
0
t→∞ t
t→∞ t
ν∈Caa
0

− lim

= min KL(ν, µθ )
ν∈∆(X)

subject to

min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) ≤ 0 min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ),

θ0 ∈Θaa0

as claimed.
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θ ∈Θa0 a

A.2.2

General decision problems

Continue to fix a perceived signal structure µ̂. We turn to general decision problems.
Building on Lemma 3, the following lemma uses our learning efficiency index to
characterize the rate at which the probability of choosing an ex-post suboptimal act
vanishes as t → ∞ under Assumption 3.
Lemma 4. Let A be a regular and non-trivial decision problem and suppose that
Assumption 2 and SA -consistency (Assumption 3) are satisfied. Fix θ∗ ∈ Θ and let
a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈A aθ∗ denote the ex-post optimal act at θ∗ . Then


1
∗
max pt · (a − a ) > 0
−w(θ , µ, µ̂, SA ) = lim log Pθ∗
t→∞ t
a∈A\{a∗ }


1
∗
max pt · (a − a ) ≥ 0 .
= lim log Pθ∗
t→∞ t
a∈A\{a∗ }
∗

Proof. Since a∗ is uniquely optimal at θ∗ (by regularity of A), we have a 6≥ a∗ for all
a ∈ A \ {a∗ }. Consider any a ∈ A \ {a∗ } with a∗ 6≥ a, which exists as A is non-trivial.
Then, by Lemma 3,
1
1
log Pθ∗ [{pt · (a − a∗ ) > 0}] = − lim log Pθ∗ [{pt · (a − a∗ ) ≥ 0}]
t→∞ t
t→∞ t
= min KL(ν, µθ∗ ) s.t. 0 min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) ≤ 0 min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 )

− lim

θ ∈Θaa∗

ν∈∆(X)

= min KL(ν, µθ∗ ) s.t.
ν∈∆(X)

θ ∈Θa∗ a

min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) = min
KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ),
0

θ0 ∈Θaa∗

θ ∈Θ

where the final equality holds as Θaa∗ and Θa∗ a partition Θ by regularity of A. At
the same time, for any a 6= a∗ with a∗ ≥ a, Pθ∗ [pt · (a − a∗ ) ≥ 0] = 0 for all t, as pt
always has full-support.
S
Since Θ \ SA (θ∗ ) = a6=a∗ Θaa∗ , we therefore have
− max∗ lim

a∈A\{a } t→∞

1
1
log Pθ∗ [{pt · (a − a∗ ) > 0}] = − max∗ lim log Pθ∗ [{pt · (a − a∗ ) ≥ 0}]
t→∞
a∈A\{a }
t
t

= min KL(ν, µθ∗ ) s.t.
ν∈∆(X)

= min KL(ν, µθ∗ ) s.t.
ν∈∆(X)

min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) = min
KL(ν, µ̂θ0 )
0

θ0 6∈SA (θ∗ )

θ ∈Θ

min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) ≤

θ0 6∈SA (θ∗ )

min KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ).

θ0 ∈SA (θ∗ )

We claim that the last line is equal to w(θ∗ , µ, µ̂, SA ). Consider any solution ν to the
minimization problem. We show that minθ0 6∈SA (θ∗ ) KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) = minθ0 ∈SA (θ∗ ) KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ),
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i.e., the constraint holds with equality. Indeed, note that by SA -consistency, ν 6= µθ∗ .
Thus, if minθ0 6∈SA (θ∗ ) KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ) < minθ0 ∈SA (θ∗ ) KL(ν, µ̂θ0 ), then by strict convexity of
KL(·, µθ∗ ), we can choose ε > 0 sufficiently small such that ν 0 = (1 − ε)ν + εµθ∗
still satisfies the constraint but achieves a strictly smaller objective KL(ν 0 , µθ∗ ), a
contradiction.
Hence, exchanging lim and max, we have
1
log max∗ Pθ∗ [{pt · (a − a∗ ) > 0}] ,
t→∞ t
a∈A\{a }
1
−w(θ∗ , µ, µ̂, SA ) = lim log max∗ Pθ∗ [{pt · (a − a∗ ) ≥ 0}] .
t→∞ t
a∈A\{a }

−w(θ∗ , µ, µ̂, SA ) = lim

(17)
(18)

Finally, for each t,



max Pθ∗ [{pt · (a − a ) > 0}] ≤ Pθ∗
max pt · (a − a ) > 0
a∈A\{a∗ }
a∈A\{a∗ }


∗
≤ Pθ ∗
max∗ pt · (a − a ) ≥ 0
∗

∗

a∈A\{a }

≤ (|A| − 1) max∗ Pθ∗ [{pt · (a − a∗ ) ≥ 0}] .
a∈A\{a }

Combined with (17) and (18), we obtain the desired conclusion.
A.2.3

Proof of Theorem 3

Fix any partition S of Θ and µ, µ̂1 , µ̂2 satisfying Assumptions 2–3. Suppose w(µ, µ̂1 , S) >
w(µ, µ̂2 , S) and consider any non-trivial and regular decision problem A with SA = S.
Let piT ∈ ∆(Θ) denote the (random) posterior of agent i following T signal draws.
Slightly generalizing the main text, we allow for the possibility that (4) features multiple subjectively optimal acts at some posteriors. In this case, agents employ an
arbitrary strict total order over A to break ties, where tie-breaking rules can differ
across agents.
Since A is regular, for each state θ, there is a unique ex-post optimal act aθ ∈
argmaxa∈A aθ . Since A and Θ are finite, there exists a constant K > 0 such that for
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all T and i = 1, 2,
−K

X


p0 (θ)Pθ

θ

≤ WT (µ, µ̂i , A) −

max

a∈A\{aθ }

X

piT


· (a − a ) ≥ 0
θ

p0 (θ)aθθ

θ


X
1
i
θ
≤−
p0 (θ)Pθ
max pT · (a − a ) > 0 .
K θ
a∈A\{aθ }

Note the inequalities hold regardless of how agents break ties in case of indifference.
Thus, to show that there exists T ∗ such that WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) > WT (µ, µ̂2 , A) for all
T ≥ T ∗ , it suffices to show that for all sufficiently large T ,


P
2
θ
p
(θ)P
max
θ } pT · (a − a ) > 0
0
θ
a∈A\{a

 > K 2.
Pθ
1
θ) ≥ 0
p
(θ)P
max
p
·
(a
−
a
θ
θ
a∈A\{a } T
θ 0

(19)

By Lemma 4,


P
maxa∈A\{aθ } p2T · (a − aθ ) > 0
θ p0 (θ)Pθ

=
P
maxa∈A\{aθ } p1T · (a − aθ ) ≥ 0
θ p0 (θ)Pθ

P
2
p0 (θ)e−T w(θ,µ,µ̂ ,SA )+o(T )
θ
P
−T w(θ,µ,µ̂1 ,SA )+o(T )
θ p0 (θ)e

≥

p0 (θ)e−T w(θ,µ,µ̂ ,SA )+o(T )
, ∀θ.
e−T minθ w(θ,µ,µ̂1 ,SA )+o(T )

2

Since minθ w(θ, µ, µ̂1 , SA ) > minθ w(θ, µ, µ̂2 , SA ), this implies (19) for T sufficiently
large.

A.3

Proof of Proposition 2

Consider any T . Condition (11) implies that either

or

T
T
T
Y
µθ (xt ) Y µ̂1θ (xt ) Y µ̂θ2 (xt )
≥
≥
µ (x ) t=1 µ̂1θ (xt ) t=1 µ̂2θ (xt )
t=1 θ t

∀xT ∈ X T ,

T
T
T
Y
µθ (xt ) Y µ̂1θ (xt ) Y µ̂θ2 (xt )
≤
≤
µ (x ) t=1 µ̂1θ (xt ) t=1 µ̂2θ (xt )
t=1 θ t

∀xT ∈ X T .

Thus, the same argument as in Proposition 1 yields that WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) ≥ WT (µ, µ̂2 , A)
for any decision problem A (where we can again allow for ties as long as both agents
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use the same tie-breaking rule).

A.4

Proof of Proposition 3

We first establish the following lemma, which will be used to prove the “only if”
direction of Proposition 3:
Lemma 5. Fix any µ. There exists a unique ν ∗ ∈ I(µ) such that w(µ, µ) =
KL(ν ∗ , µθ ) = KL(ν ∗ , µθ ). Moreover, ν ∗ (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X and there exist λθ , λθ > 0
and Cθ , Cθ ∈ R such that


µθ (x)
,
∇ν KL(ν , µθ ) = 1 + Cθ + λθ log
µθ (x) x∈X


µθ (x)
∗
.
∇ν KL(ν , µθ ) = 1 + Cθ + λθ log
µθ (x) x∈X
∗

Proof. By definition, ν ∈ I(µ) if and only if KL(ν, µθ ) = KL(ν, µθ ). Thus, w(µ, µ) =
KL(ν ∗ , µθ ) = KL(ν ∗ , µθ ) if and only if ν ∗ ∈ argminν∈I(µ) KL(ν, µθ ) = argminν∈I(µ) KL(ν, µθ ).
Moreover, argminν∈I(µ) KL(ν, µθ ) = {ν ∗ } is a singleton, since I(µ) is nonempty, compact and convex and KL(·, µθ ) is continuous and convex.
To see that ν ∗ (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X, suppose instead that ν ∗ (x) = 0 for some
x ∈ X. Consider any other ν̂ ∈ I(µ) with ν̂(x) > 0.23 For each ε ∈ [0, 1], consider
νε := (1 − ε)ν ∗ + εν̂ ∈ I(µ). Then for each θ,
KL(νε , µθ ) − KL(ν ∗ , µθ )
= −∞,
ε&0
ε
lim

contradicting the fact that ν ∗ ∈ argminν∈I(µ) KL(ν, µθ ).
For the final part, consider state θ; the argument for state θ is analogous. Since
∗
ν (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X, KL(ν, µθ ) is differentiable in ν at ν ∗ . As we saw in the proof
23
ν̂(x)
ν̂(x)

Such a ν̂ exists: If µθ (x) = µθ (x), set ν̂(x) = 1. If µθ (x) > µθ (x), set ν̂(x) + ν̂(x) = 1 and
log

=
log

µθ (x)
µ (x)
θ
µ (x)
θ
µθ (x)

for some x such that µθ (x) > µθ (x). The case µθ (x) < µθ (x) is analogous.
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of Lemma 4, ν ∗ ∈ ∆(X) also solves the following relaxed problem:
min KL(ν, µθ ) s.t. KL(ν, µθ ) ≤ KL(ν, µθ )

ν∈∆(X)

= min KL(ν, µθ ) s.t.
ν∈∆(X)

X
x∈X

ν(x) log

µθ (x)
≤ 0.
µθ (x)

Thus, we have the following first-order conditions at ν ∗ : There exist Lagrange multipliers λθ ≥ 0 and Cθ ∈ R such that for all x,
log

µθ (x)
ν ∗ (x)
+ Cθ .
= λθ log
µθ (x)
µθ (x)

(20)

P
µ (x)
If λθ = 0, then (20) implies ν ∗ = µθ , which violates the constraint x∈X ν(x) log µθ (x) ≤
θ


∗ (x)
for any
0, since µθ 6= µθ . Thus, λθ > 0. Since ∇ν KL(ν ∗ , µ0 ) = 1 + log νµ0 (x)
x∈X
µ0 ∈ int∆(X), (20) becomes


µθ (x)
∇ν KL(ν , µθ ) = 1 + Cθ + λθ log
,
µθ (x) x∈X
∗

as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 3: For the “if” direction, suppose µ̂ ∈ PE(µ). Then, as noted
in the main text, I(µ̂) = I(µ). Thus, w(µ, µ) = w(µ, µ̂).
For the “only if” direction, suppose that µ̂ ∈
/ PE(µ). By Lemma 5, there exists a
∗
∗
unique ν ∈ I(µ) such that ν (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X and
w(µ, µ) = KL(ν ∗ , µθ ) = KL(ν ∗ , µθ ).
First, suppose that ν ∗ ∈
/ I(µ̂). Then either KL(ν ∗ , µ̂θ ) < KL(ν ∗ , µ̂θ ) or KL(ν ∗ , µ̂θ ) <
KL(ν ∗ , µ̂θ ). We only consider the former case, as the latter case is analogous. As in
the proof of Lemma 4, w(θ, µ, µ̂) can equivalently be written as the value of the
following relaxed problem:
w(θ, µ, µ̂) = 0 min KL(ν 0 , µθ ) s.t. KL(ν 0 , µ̂θ ) ≤ KL(ν 0 , µ̂θ ).
ν ∈∆(X)
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(21)

Since KL(·, µ̂θ ) and KL(·, µ̂θ ) are continuous, for ε ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently small,
KL((1 − ε)ν ∗ + εµθ , µ̂θ ) < KL((1 − ε)ν ∗ + εµθ , µ̂θ ).
Thus, (1 − ε)ν ∗ + εµθ satisfies the constraint in (21). But, by convexity of KL(·, µθ )
and since w(µ, µ) > 0 (because µθ 6= µθ )
KL((1 − ε)ν ∗ + εµθ , µθ ) ≤ (1 − ε)KL(ν ∗ , µθ ) + εKL(µθ , µθ ) < w(µ, µ).
Thus, w(µ, µ̂) ≤ w(θ, µ, µ̂) < w(µ, µ).
Next, suppose that ν ∗ ∈ I(µ̂). Since µ̂ ∈
/ PE(µ) and

I(µ) =




µθ
µ̂θ
ν ∈ ∆(X) : ν · log
= 0 , I(µ̂) = ν ∈ ∆(X) : ν · log
=0 ,
µθ
µ̂θ
µ

µ

there exists ν ∈ I(µ̂) \ I(µ). Then either ν · log µθ < 0 or ν · log µθθ < 0. We only
θ
consider the former case, as the latter case is analogous. For each ε ∈ (0, 1), define
νε = (1 − ε)ν ∗ + εν.
Since both ν ∗ , ν ∈ I(µ̂), we have νε ∈ I(µ̂). Moreover, by Lemma 5, there exists
λθ > 0 such that
µθ
KL(νε , µθ ) − KL(ν ∗ , µθ )
= (ν − ν ∗ ) · ∇ν KL(ν ∗ , µθ ) = λθ ν · log
< 0.
∗
ε→0
εkν − ν k2
µθ
lim

Thus, for ε > 0 sufficiently small, we have νε ∈ I(µ̂) and KL(νε , µθ ) < KL(ν ∗ , µθ ) =
w(µ, µ). Hence, w(µ, µ̂) ≤ w(θ, µ, µ̂) < w(µ, µ).

A.5

Proof of Theorem 2

Fix µ̂1 and µ̂2 satisfying Assumption 2. Take any non-trivial decision problem A.
It is without loss to assume that A contains no dominated acts, since agents would
never choose such acts given that their posteriors pTi have full support at each signal
history. As in the proof of Theorem 3, we allow for the possibility that (4) features
multiple subjectively optimal acts at some posteriors, in which case agents employ
(possibly different) tie-breaking rules.
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Let a (resp. a) denote the unique act in A that is ex-post optimal at θ (resp. θ).
Since A does not contain dominated acts, we have
[a(θ) < a(θ), ∀a ∈ A \ {a}]

and

[a(θ) < a(θ), ∀a ∈ A \ {a}].

(22)

First part: By (22), there exists a constant K > 0 such that for all T and i = 1, 2,





1
i
max
max pT · (a − a) > 0
−Kp0 (θ)Pθ
· (a − a) ≥ 0 + p0 (θ)Pθ
a∈A\{a}
a∈A\{a}
K
≤ WT (µ, µ̂i , A) − p0 (θ)a(θ) − p0 (θ)a(θ)




1
i
i
≤ − p0 (θ)Pθ
max pT · (a − a) > 0 + Kp0 (θ)Pθ
max pT · (a − a) ≥ 0
a∈A\{a}
a∈A\{a}
K
piT

Thus, to show that there exists T ∗ such that WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) > WT (µ, µ̂2 , A) for all
T ≥ T ∗ , it suffices to show that for all sufficiently large T ,




maxa∈A\{a} p1T · (a − a) ≥ 0 + p0 (θ)Pθ maxa∈A\{a} p2T · (a − a) ≥ 0
1



 < 2.
2
1
K
p0 (θ)Pθ maxa∈A\{a} pT · (a − a) > 0 + p0 (θ)Pθ maxa∈A\{a} pT · (a − a) > 0
(23)

p0 (θ)Pθ

Since both agents satisfy case (i), the same argument as in Lemma 4 implies that
for all θ and i = 1, 2,


1
i
log Pθ
max pT · (a − a) > 0
−w(θ, µ, µ̂ ) = lim
T →∞ T
a∈A\{a}


1
i
log Pθ
= lim
max pT · (a − a) ≥ 0 .
T →∞ T
a∈A\{a}
i

Hence, the fact that min{w(θ, µ, µ̂1 ), w(θ, µ, µ̂2 )} < min{w(θ, µ, µ̂2 ), w(θ, µ, µ̂1 )} implies (23) for all sufficiently large T .
Second part: The proof is analogous to the first part.
Third part: By (22), there exists a constant K > 0 such that for all T and
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i = 1, 2,




1
1
i
i
max pT · (a − a) > 0
p0 (θ)Pθ
max pT · (a − a) > 0 + p0 (θ)Pθ
a∈A\{a}
a∈A\{a}
K
K
≤ WTi (µ, µ̂i , A) − p0 (θ)a(θ) − p0 (θ)a(θ)




i
i
max pT · (a − a) ≥ 0 + Kp0 (θ)Pθ
≤ Kp0 (θ)Pθ
max pT · (a − a) ≥ 0 .
a∈A\{a}

a∈A\{a}

Thus, to show that there exists T ∗ such that WT (µ, µ̂1 , A) > WT (µ, µ̂2 , A) for all
T ≥ T ∗ , it suffices to show that for all sufficiently large T ,




maxa∈A\{a} p2T · (a − a) ≥ 0 + p0 (θ)Pθ maxa∈A\{a} p2T · (a − a) ≥ 0
1



 < 2.
1
1
K
p0 (θ)Pθ maxa∈A\{a} pT · (a − a) > 0 + p0 (θ)Pθ maxa∈A\{a} pT · (a − a) > 0
(24)
p0 (θ)Pθ

Since both agents satisfy case (iii), the same argument as in Lemma 4 implies that
for each i = 1, 2,
1
−w(θ, µ, µ̂ ) = lim
T →∞ T
1
= lim
T →∞ T
1
−w(θ, µ, µ̂i ) = lim
T →∞ T
1
= lim
T →∞ T
i




log Pθ
max
· (a − a) > 0
a∈A\{a}


i
log Pθ
max pT · (a − a) ≥ 0
a∈A\{a}


i
log Pθ
max pT · (a − a) > 0
a∈A\{a}


i
log Pθ
max pT · (a − a) ≥ 0 .
piT

a∈A\{a}

Hence, the fact that minθ w(µ, µ̂1 ) < minθ w(µ, µ̂2 ) implies (24) for all sufficiently
large T .

A.6

Proof of Theorem 4

The proof follows the same arguments as in Theorem 3 and is thus omitted. In
particular, analogous to Lemma 4, one can show that, in any non-trivial decision
problem, w(θ, µ, M̂ i ) corresponds to the exponential rate at which the probability
that agent i chooses an ex-post suboptimal act in state θ vanishes as T → ∞.
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A.7

Proof of Proposition 4

Observe that
w(θ, µ, M̂ ) = min KL(ν, µθ )

subject to

ν∈∆(X)

min KL(ν, µ̂θ ) ≥ min KL(ν, µ̂θ )

µ̂∈M̂

≥ min min KL(ν, µθ )

subject to

≥ min min KL(ν, µθ )

subject to

µ̂∈M̂ ν∈∆(X)

µ̂∈M̂

min KL(ν, µ̂0θ ) ≥ KL(ν, µ̂θ )

µ̂0 ∈M̂

µ̂∈M̂ ν∈∆(X)

KL(ν, µ̂θ ) ≥ KL(ν, µ̂θ )

= min w(θ, µ, µ̂).
µ̂∈M̂

Here, the first and the last equalities follow from the definition of the efficiency index
and Assumption 4 by analogous arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4. A similar
argument shows w(θ, µ, M̂ ) ≥ minµ̂∈M̂ w(θ, µ, µ̂). Thus, w(µ, M̂ ) ≥ minµ̂∈M̂ w(µ, µ̂).
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